Sunday, June 7, 2015

日本創生会議への違和感

まだ漠然としているけれど、これだけは確か、と思えるのは、日本の伝統と西洋由来の合理主義のミックスの仕方において、最悪なコンビネーションがここでも如何なく発揮されているということ。
シンプル化すると、ヒトの命は軽く、だからこそ計量可能だ、というもの。

「地方創生」とか「地方再生」とか言うけれど、そもそも「地方」という言葉はあまり有効でないような気がする。
この「地方」という言葉が意味をなすのは、「中央」との関係性において。
したがって、「中央」と「地方」とがどうしても存在する、現状の主権国家を大枠とした統治形態において、政治家なり、行政なり、思想家なりが、「中央」と「地方」とを、単なる対立概念としてではなく、どちらも日本国民が生活する場として、政策枠組み、行政枠組み、および思想枠組みを検討・構築・見直しを不断に行っていなければ、「地方」というのは、単に、経営的に非効率で、土地(都市部からすると貴重な資源)だけは余っている、というような捉え方しかされえないから。

こうしたいわば国家とは何か?に関わる制度、政策、思想が一朝一夕にして変わるとは思われない。
ゆえに、私としては、現行の行政、各種社会福祉制度がこのままでよいとは到底思わないけれど、「人間が平均して80年もの人生を過ごしていくということはどういうことか?」。その考え方を地道に充実させていくことに集中したい。いわば、急がば回れ。
「この逼迫した危機から目を背けるか?」と「待ったなし」派の声も小さくはないだろう。
が。
人間の歴史って短いけれど、結構長いこと(2千年とか)色々なデータを残してくれている。
それに基づけば、「目先の不安感に煽られてあまりいいことはない」ということ。
それよりも、自分達って一体何なのか?人生ってどう送ることができればまあまあ充実感持って死んでいけるか?とかをきちんと考えられるようになる方がよっぽど大切だと思う。何故なら、一寸先だって実は闇だから。みんな「予測できることも予測しようとしないなんて馬鹿だ!無責任だ!」って思っているようだけれど、その「馬鹿!」「無責任!」って断言だって、実はそれほど確証が持てているわけではない。いくら「いやこの程度は絶対です!」と強がってみたところで、その人だって究極の真理なんて何も断言などできはしないのだから。一人の人間である以上。どちらかというと、知りもしないクセに「絶対」とか言ってる時点で、そっちの方が倫理的に問題ありとも言える。

発言するなら皆の希望が湧くように。「いや。この程度は基本やし。全く馬鹿を疎外しようなんて考えてないですよ。」なんてこと言っていたって、圧倒的多数の知性に優れた方の人々は、「自分は大丈夫」ってボーダーを引いている。それはいくら善意にやったってどうしようもないことなんだと。そのような気づきがない以上、自らのパワーがより弱い人々の選択肢を狭める方向に作用してしまう、ということなど気づけないだろう。要するに平気で、いいことしているつもりでかなり多くの人間の人生にマイナスの影響を及ぼしてしまうということ。これなんとかしないと、いつまでたってもくだらない争いが絶えないだろう。
一人一人感情は持っていて、加えてその人なりの「正しさ」の感覚だって持っている。
そういったものの圧倒的多数は表に現れず、流れ去っていってしまっている。
勿論全部100%を認識し、それを踏まえて行動したり発言したりなんてことは不可能。
だとしても、自分もヒトなら他者もヒトだ、ぐらいの認識は必要だろう。


やっぱり学校?私塾?かなぁ。。。やるべきことは。。。お金とか稼ぐための能力開発だけではなく、人間のこと考えていたって、生きていくこと、多少の人間を養い、育てていくことは可能だ、ということを示さなければならないし。。。
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Tony Soprano and reflexive socialisation in late modernity | The Sociological Imagination

Tony Soprano and reflexive socialisation in late modernity

Posted By Mark Carrigan
Watching the Sopranos, I was struck by what a good example this was of what Margaret Archer argues are the consequences of the intensification of social change for intergenerational socialisation: the decreasing likelihood that children will encounter occupational roles familiar to their parents will tend to increase the degree of reflexivity with which the parents orientate themselves to the lives of their children. If they don't feel they understand the occupation world their children are entering tha[e]n what might have otherwise be a transmission of normative guidance is more likely to become a generalised expression of support as they make their own choices.

It seems that Margaret Archer's reflexivity builds upon dubious conception of self-other relationship.

To orientate one to particular others' lives does not seem to be increase of reflexivity, in my view. It rather appear to be one's self-serving assumption that one can appropriately sufficiently imagine such particular others' lives. In other words, if reflexivity refers to one's capacity to imagine certain others' lives setting aside one's own, it should orientate one towards one's own, rather than such others', experiences. While it may sound quite the contrary, it is actually not. Just remember: Can any of us assert that s/he even sufficiently appropriately manages to imagine any other's lives? The answer is definitely 'No'. Then, so assuming is quite the opposite to the increase of reflexivity thus decrease of it. The increase of reflexivity should lead one to be reflexive to the degree that one comes to know of the impossibility to imagine even sufficiently appropriately lives of as intimate others as one's children. 
Then, the argument of Archer and/or the episode from the Sopranos that the author refers to rather explicate the consequences of the intensification of social change as exacerbation of the conventional (modernist/positivist) assumption that we can understand anything objectively, regardless of material artifacts or human beings. Because modernists assume that they can orientate themselves to particular others' lives without regard to the intricacy inherent in assuming others' whereabouts, they tend to believe that they are sufficiently reflexive only if they refrain from prescribing certain normative guidance, which they believe builds upon their own experiences, and instead, give such others 'if-I-were-you' statements. The flaw of modernist/positivist conception about self-other relationship resides in these shallow assumptions that one can, even if only imaginatively, take others' roles/positions; ideas/opinions established by putting one in others' shoes can exempt one from prescription of self-serving and/or anecdotal normative guidance; and 'if-I-were-you' statements, typically if they are supportive of particular others, can demonstrate one's compassion towards such others as a means to exempt one from bearing responsibility for such others' whereabouts and future basing such exemption on their admittance of utter differences between one's own and such others' experiences. 
This appears trivial and too critical, but is actually significant for construction and management of social reality. First, mere admittance of differences in experiences between different actors never exempts anyone from bearing responsibility for her/his own sense of moral/evaluative appropriateness. That each actor has uniquely her/his own experiences is a presumption. Second, even if each of us is an independent individual, none of us is capable of  going about everyday life without entrusting others to speak for one's being. Hence, rendering others support in tangible forms can never exhaust further possible support. On the contrary, believing that tangible support is  an exclusive means to render support to others is irresponsible or unethical in the sense that such a belief is actually meant exclusively for concluding contracts that falsely draw boundaries of moral responsibilities, often by the more powerful's taking advantage of power imbalances. Third, unless conceptualizing self and others to be never conclusively separable, actors are fated to continue to be unaware that the only means to be ethical is to read others' moral sentiments, which can rarely be observed directly; thus, they continue to be complacent about their own assumptions about reality without regard to negative effects of their actions and/or words on the more vulnerable /less powerful. Regardless of being self-serving or empathetic, taking actions, including expressing words/voices, are felicitous events. Besides, no observable action can be made without excluding other possible reality. In other words, it is both theoretically and practically impossible for anybody to be exempted from bearing moral responsibility for such inevitable negative impacts on others. The only means to compensate for this inescapable moral dilemma is to act in ways that enhance others' taking actions. 
Such is, however, not possible merely by offering guidance or supportive comments. Rather, actors ought to attempt to encourage others to tell their own stories in their own ways. To do so, first and foremost, one needs to contemplate one's own moral sentiments; then, proceed to proposing ways of mimicking one's ways by which to come about one's moral sentiments. By so doing, others are expected to imagine their own moral sentiments by reference to actions/words presented to them. We need to renew our understandings about mundane interactions with other actors in ways that put what is not observable on the center of interactions. Ideally, we communicate with each other's moral sentiments by means of plot, which consists of five constitutive elements: acts, actors, scenes, purposes and agencies, and which operates along the triadic logic of imagination, apprehension and consensual validation.

  

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